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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some leximetric data for a number of 
developed and less developed countries hitherto unavailable to examine (i) the 
changing state of shareholder protection and (ii) its connection with stock market 
development and capital accumulation. It finds a strong evidence of legal 
globalisation but no evidence of its favourable link with stock market development 
and capital formation. 
 
* The work reported here was presented at the conference, 
titled,”Globalization and Its Discontents” (June 8-9, 2007) at  SUNY, Cortland, 
USA. I thankfully acknowledge the encouragement and support I received from 
Professors Ajit Singh, Simon Deakin and others at CBR. However the usual 
disclaimer applies. 
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Introduction 
 
Gone are the days of state investment in a mixed economic framework. New mantra 
of the present day world under the so-called Washington Consensus is 
liberalization, privatization and globalisation (LPG). Countries that already have a 
large public sector are advised to privatize by selling shares of the public sector to 
private individuals and/or companies. The role of government is to provide a proper 
legal framework under which stock market can flourish and provide the necessary 
private finance for capital formation and growth. One aspect of this is to provide an 
adequate protection of the rights of the shareholders under the aegis of corporate 
governance. Since the end of the 1980s or the beginning of the 1990s, both the 
developed and   the less developed countries have been trying to improve their laws 
relating to shareholder protection. Apart from the capitalist ethics concerning 
property rights there is a concern for stock market development for the sake of 
capital accumulation and growth. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze some leximetric data for a number of 
developed and less developed countries hitherto unavailable to examine (i) the 
changing state of shareholder protection and (ii) its connection with stock market 
development and capital accumulation.  
 
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development 
 
Following mainly the pioneering work of LLSV (La Porta et al., 1998), some legal 
scholars are now-a-days involved in quantifying the laws for easy comparability 
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across different countries over time – known as leximetric study. One such project 
has been undertaken by a team of legal scholars at the University of Cambridge 
(Centre for Business School, CBR). It has produced a comprehensive dataset for 
shareholder protection in four developed countries such as France, Germany, UK 
and USA and one less developed country, India over a long span of time, 1970-2005 
(see Lele and Siems, 2006 for details).  For each country time series data for 60 
indicators of stock market development are available. Subsequently ten important 
indicators were chosen to reflect the changing state of shareholder protection and 
these data are available for 20 countries (including the above mentioned 5 countries) 
over the period, 1995-2005. Details of the procedure of constructing these series are 
available in Appendix.  
 
The sample of 20 covers 9 developed countries-DCs (that include the above 
mentioned four and Canada, Italy, Japan, Spain and Switzerland) and 11 other less 
developed countries-LDCs (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, China, India, 
Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan and South Africa).  In Table 1 the average state 
of shareholder protection (simple aggregation of 10 variables in each point of time 
averaged over 1995-2005) is shown for each country.  These data show that Canada 
has the highest level of shareholder protection with a score of 7.25 (out of the 
maximum possible score of 10) followed by Japan, UK, France and USA (the last 
three countries are very close to each other). Among the LDC group Malaysia has 
the highest level of protection with a value above 6 followed by China, South Africa 
and India. 
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In Figure 1, the trends in the over-all shareholder protection in the 9-country group 
of DCs, the 11-country group of LDCs and all of the 20 countries are shown. The 
graph shows a clear improvement in shareholder protection in both DCs and LDCs. 
There is a clear evidence of intra-DCs and intra-LDCs convergence between 1995 
and 2002 as the graph of the coefficients of variation shows (Figure 2). There was a 
strong tendency towards convergence across the DC-LDC divide between 1997 and 
2002 followed by a slight tendency towards divergence.  In fact law changes in the 
DCs with an eye to better corporate governance and improved shareholder 
protection and the LDCs follow with a lag. Legal globalisation is thus another facet 
of the present LPG regime. 
 
In this perspective we examine the link between shareholder protection (SP) and 
development of stock market in these countries. From World Bank Financial 
Structure Dataset we get data on stock market turnover ratio. It is one of the most 
important indicators of stock market development. It is constructed by deflating the 
value of stock trade by real market capitalization and so it contains the information 
of the general price level, stock market capitalization and also the value of stock 
trading. No other indicators are considered, as the relevant data are not available for 
all the countries for all the years.  
 
From World Bank World Development Indicators we get capital accumulation data 
- gross capital formation as percentage of GDP (GKFGDP) up to 2002.    All these 
data averages are presented in Table 1 along with the data on shareholder 
protection. 
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With the aid of STATA program we have considered two alternative types of panel 
regression analysis between the turnover ratio (log-values) and the shareholder 
protection index: the country-fixed effect model (FE) and the random-effect model 
(RE). The FE is designed to control for omitted variables that differ across countries 
but are constant over time. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for 
each country-cases and including them in a standard linear regression to control for 
these fixed country-effects.  The RE is used if there is a reason to believe that some 
omitted variables may be constant over time but vary between cases, and the others 
may be fixed between cases but vary over time.  The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test has been conducted to choose the appropriate model. It strongly 
supports the RE model.   
 
The estimates are reported in Table 2.  These show that there is no significant 
relationship between the turnover ratio and the shareholder protection index.  We 
have re-run the regression with intercept and/or slope dummy for the developed 
countries (DC and SDC).  None of the dummies is significant and the basic 
conclusion of no relationship between the turnover ratio and the shareholder 
protection index remains unaltered (in these cases also the RE model is found to be 
appropriate).  
 
Instead of using binary dummy variable, DC, we have also considered the 1990-94 
average per capita GDP (measured in internationally comparable purchasing power 
parity constant dollar), PCY90-94 (available from World Bank data on World 
Development Indicators), in the regression.  Inclusion of this initial condition of 
high income (developed countries tend to have higher initial per capita income) in 
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our analysis does not tell a different story and it also does not have an effect on the 
turnover ratio.  
 
It appears from our analysis that the shareholder protection law and stock market 
development as indicated by the turnover ratio are not related at the cross-country 
level – even across the developed countries (with more shareholder protection) 
covered in our sample. Our earlier time series analysis involving four developed 
countries (France, Germany, UK, USA) and India over a long span of time, 1970-
2005 also observed the same thing for a more detailed dataset of shareholder 
protection laws (Fagernäs et al., 2007 and Sarkar, 2007). 
 
Next we examine whether stock market developments as measured by the turnover 
ratio has any relationship with fixed capital formation - gross capital formation as 
percentage of GDP (GKFGDP). We replicate the earlier study with and without 
dummies for developed countries and the initial per capita GDP (PCY90-94). In 
each case the RE model is found to be the appropriate one.  In no case do we get a 
significant relationship between the stock market developments and capital 
formation even after taking into account the development status of the countries and 
the initial per capita income (Table 3).  
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up our study, the country-wise variation in shareholder protection has no 
relationship with the turnover ratio. It cannot be said that the countries belonging to 
this DC group having a higher shareholder protection tend to have a higher stock 
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market development. Nor can we say that a higher stock market development is 
associated with a higher rate of capital formation (GKFGDP).  So our study 
contradicts the convention wisdom in this field (as reflected in Djankov et al., 2005) 
 
As the data on shareholder protection is available only for a short period, 1995-
2005, no time series study of individual countries is done. It is available for a long 
period 1970-2005 for five countries and these data are analysed elsewhere and these 
studies show (Fagernäs et al., 2005, Sarkar 2007) that shareholder protection does 
not have a positive long-term link with stock market development.  It is also 
observed that stock market development has by and large no long-term positive 
relationship with capital accumulation for a number of less developed countries 
(Sarkar, 2006). 
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Table 1 
Per Capita GDP, Capital Formation, Shareholder Protection and 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio: Selected Countries 
 
(annual averages) 
Countries Per Capita GDP 
(Purchasing 
Power Parity 
Constant Dollar  
(1990-94) 
GKFGDP 
 
 
(1995-2002) 
Shareholder 
Protection 
Index1 
(1995-2005) 
Turnover 
Ratio2 
 
(1995-2005) 
 Developed 
Countries 
    
Canada 23000 20.05 7.25 61 
Japan 23900 26.58 7.16 66 
UK 20300 17.23 6.75 77 
France 22300 19.36 6.64 74 
USA 29000 19.22 6.59 135 
Spain 16300 23.89 5.07 159 
Germany 23000 21.05 4.73 107 
Italy 22200 19.46 4.49 92 
Switzerland 28100 22.48 4.05 89 
 Less Developed 
Countries 
    
Malaysia 6340 31.52 6.05 39 
China 1980 21.88 5.93 138 
South Africa 9430 16.32 5.49 92 
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India 1760 22.96 5.35 140 
Brazil 6490 21.12 4.89 47 
Argentina 10400 16.96 3.91 19 
Czechoslovakia 11700 22.00 3.48 53 
Chile 6630 24.22 3.25 10 
Latvia 6700 24.6 3.14 203 
Mexico 7760 22.76 2.67 30 
Pakistan 1680 16.88 2.23 262 
 
1 Legal scholars of Centre for Business Research (CBR), University of 
Cambridge have compiled a large time-series dataset on shareholder protection as a 
part of the ESRC project on Law, Finance and Development. For details of the 
construction of these leximetric data see Lele and Siems (2006). In these CBR data, 
originally 60 indicators of shareholder protection were considered and finally these 
were reduced to 10 important (judged by the legal scholars involved in the project) 
variables. We have derived the aggregate index of a particular country by adding 
each of the legal variables at a point of time (year).  Then it is averaged over the 
period for which the data are available. For maximum protection the index would 
assume the value 10 (as 1 is the maximum value for each of the 10 indicators). So 
the lower the value the lower is the level of protection. 
2 Value of Stock trade as percentage of real market capitalization. 
3 Average of 1996-2005. 
Sources: GKFGDP from World Bank World Development Indicators, Turnover 
Ratio from World Financial Market Dataset of World Bank and Shareholder 
Protection Index from the CBR project mentioned in the note 1 of this table. 
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Table 2 
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development1: 
Panel Data Analysis, 1995-2005 
 
c Shareholder 
Protection 
Index (SP) 
Intercept 
Dummy 
for 
Developed
Countries 
(DC) 2 
Slope 
Dummy 
for 
Developed
Countries 
(SDCSP)  
Initial 
Per 
Capita  
Income- 
log 
values 
(PCY90
-94) 
R-Sq LM test 
statistic 
for RE 
Model3 
-1.01** 0.09    0.06 491.85 
-1.19** 0.06 0.7   0.17 436.94 
-0.46 0.09   -0.06 0.07 483.46 
-0.91* -0.01 -0.31 0.19  0.12 412.23 
 
* Significant at 5 per cent level. 
** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
1 As stock market development indicator, we have used stock market turnover 
ratio. Its log value is the dependent variable. 
2 Intercept dummy, DC = 1 for developed countries and = 0 for less developed 
countries. Slope dummy, SDCSP = DC x SP. 
 3     The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic. It supports the 
random-effect model (RE) model in every case. 
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Table 3 
Stock Market Development and Capital Formation1: 
Panel Data Analysis, 1995-2005 
 
c Turnover 
Ratio-log 
values 
(LTURN) 
Intercept 
Dummy 
for 
Developed 
Countries 
(DC) 2 
Slope 
Dummy for 
Developed 
Countries 
(SDCTRN)  
 
Initial 
Per 
Capita  
Income 
–log 
values 
(PCY90
-94) 
R-Sq LM test 
statistic 
for RE 
Model3 
3.11** 0.02    0.01 381.57 
3.17** 0.03 -0.12   0.08 361.54 
3.17** 0.03 -0.13 -0.03  0.09 361.68 
3.71** 0.02 -0.06  -0.06 0.08 370.79 
 
* Significant at 5 per cent level. 
** Significant at 1 per cent level. 
1 Log value of gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP is the 
dependent variable. 
2 Intercept dummy, DC = 1 for developed countries and = 0 for less developed 
countries. Slope dummy, SDCTRN = DC x LTURN. 
3 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic. It supports the 
random-effect model (RE) model in every case. 
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Figure 1 
Aggregate Shareholder Protection Index, 1995-2005: 
Groups of 20 Countries 
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Figure 2 
Variations in Shareholder Protection Index within and across the 
Different Groups of 20 Countries, 1995-2005 
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Appendix 
Coding Shareholder Protection 
 
Variables 
 
Description 
1. Powers of the 
general meeting 
for de facto 
changes1 
 
If the sale of more than 50 % of the company’s assets requires 
approval of the general meeting it equals 1; if the sale of more 
than 80 % of the assets requires approval it equals 0.5; 
otherwise 0. 
 
2. Agenda 
setting power2 
 
Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % or less of the capital can 
put an item on the agenda; equals 0.5 if there is a hurdle of more 
than 1 % but not more than 5%; equals 0.25 if there is a hurdle 
of more than 5% but not more than 10 %; equals 0 otherwise. 
Please also indicate the exact percentage 
3. Anticipation 
of shareholder 
decision 
facilitated3 
Equals 1 if (1) postal voting is possible or (2) proxy solicitation 
with two-way voting proxy form4 has to be provided by the 
company (i.e. the directors or managers); equals 0.5 if (1) postal 
voting is possible if provided in the articles or allowed by the 
directors, or (2) the company has to provide a two-way proxy 
form but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 otherwise. 
4. Prohibition of 
multiple voting 
rights (super 
voting rights) 5 
Equals 1 if there is a prohibition of multiple voting rights; equals 
2/3 if only companies which already have multiple voting rights 
can keep them; equals 1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 
otherwise. 
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5. Independent 
board members6 
 
Equals 1 if at least half of the board members7 must be 
independent; equals 0.5 if 25 % of them must be independent; 
8equals 0 otherwise 
 
6. Feasibility of 
director’s 
dismissal 
Equals 0 if an important or good reason is required for the 
dismissal of directors; 9 equals 0.5 if there are no such 
requirements but the directors can claim for compensation on 
dismissal; equals 1 if dismissal of directors is easily feasible. 
 
7. Private 
enforcement of 
directors duties 
(derivative suit, 
shareholder  
action) 10 
Equals 0 if this is typically excluded (e.g., because of strict 
subsidiarity requirement, hurdle which is at least 10 %; cost 
rules); equals 0.5 if there are some restrictions [e.g., certain 
percentage of share capital (unless the hurdle is at least 10 %); 
cost rules; demand requirement]; equals 1 if private enforcement 
of directors duties is readily possible. 
8. Shareholder 
action against 
resolutions of 
the general 
meeting  
Equals 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against a resolution 
by the general meeting; 11 equals 0.5 if there is a threshold of at 
least 10 % voting rights; equals 0 if this kind of shareholder 
action does not exist.  
 
9. Mandatory 
bid12 
Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of 
shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 
if the mandatory bid is triggered at a higher percentage (such as 
40 or 50 %); further, it equals 0.5 if there is a mandatory bid but 
the bidder is only required to buy part of the shares; equals 0 if 
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there is no mandatory bid at all. 
 
10. Disclosure 
of major share 
ownership13 
Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the 
companies capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 
5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 if this concerns 10 %; equals 0.25 
if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise 
 
 
 16
1  Other powers of the general meeting (e.g. for amendments of the articles, 
mergers and division) are not included because they usually do not differ between 
countries. 
2  If the law of  a country does not provide the right to put an item on the agenda 
of a general meeting (including annual general meeting), one may code the right to 
call an extraordinary general meeting provided the minority shareholders can utilize 
this right to discuss any agenda. 
3 It is not enough that proxy voting is possible (which is the case in most 
countries).  
4 A two-way proxy form refers to a form which can be used in favor and against 
a proposed resolution. 
5 This may be regulated in securities law (including listing requirements). 
6 This may be regulated in a corporate governance code. 
7 It is to be noted: (1) in a two-tier system this concerns only member of the 
supervisory board (not the management board); (2) legal scholars involved in data 
compilation are only interested in the composition of boards, not in the independence 
of members of committees. 
8 Other intermediate scores are also possible. They are calculated in the same 
way, i.e. score = percentage of independent board members/2; If the law requires a 
fixed number of independent directors (e.g., always 2 independent directors), the 
(estimated) average size of boards is used in order to calculate the score. 
9 If the law of one country follows a two-tier-system, both the management and 
the supervisory board are considered. 
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10 Variables 7 and 8 only concern the law. The efficiency of courts in general are 
not considered while coding these variables. 
11 The substantive requirements for a lawful decision of the general meeting are 
not coded.  
12 This may be regulated in securities law or take over code/law. 
13 This may be regulated in securities law. 
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